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 Summary  
 
1. Studies predict there will be a dramatic decline, in the long-term, in water availability in the dry 
season in areas fed by glaciers.  The accelerated melting of the tropical Andean glaciers is an 
undisputed fact. Dozens of articles in scientific journals have charted the demise of the ‘water towers of 
the world’ as a result mainly of rising air temperatures. Different modelling methods predict small 
increases in overall water availability in many areas fed by glaciers over the next 25-50 years due to 
increased glacial melt.  However, the same models strongly suggest that water availability will diminish 
significantly during the months of the dry season, when the glaciers act as a type of buffer providing water 
for drinking, irrigation for agriculture, energy, and industry.   
  
2. Few studies have been carried out on the impact of glacial melt, even though Peru and Bolivia 
are very vulnerable. While there is an abundance of articles on glacial retreat, there are only a few 
studies on the possible impact on the social and economic development of the South American countries 
most likely to be affected by predicted seasonal water shortages, and in particular on the rural and urban 
poor.  For example, Peru and Bolivia have more than 90 per cent of the world’s tropical glaciers within 
their territories, and are also two of the poorest countries in Latin America (with 49 per cent and 63 per 
cent respectively of their populations living below the national poverty line). From the early 1970s to 2006, 
the surface area of glaciers in Peru and Bolivia decreased by 30 per cent. A long-term decline in water 
availability during the dry season would have very significant consequences for millions of poor people in 
both countries.  
 
3. If the models are correct, growing conflict over the distribution of water resources is very likely, 
particularly during the dry season. Peru is widely considered as the South American country most 
vulnerable to water shortages, while in Bolivia the issues of universal access to water and the price low-
income urban consumers should pay have provoked serious political confrontation since 2000. In both 
countries there are already competing demands: inter- and intra-departmental; urban versus rural 
consumers; and competition between commercial export agriculture, small-scale rural producers, 
hydroelectric power and mining companies.  Conflicts between sectors will become more intense as water 
becomes less available.  
 
4. Funding adaptation and mitigation measures will be critical. There will be a pressing need for 
more dams, tunnels or reservoirs (be they small- or large-scale) to collect and store more of the 
precipitation during the wet seasons. Short-term water supply deficits produced by increased demand 
from growing urban populations will be exacerbated by a long-term decline in seasonal water availability. 
Higher-income groups and donor countries or agencies should be the priorities for absorbing the cost of 
such infrastructure works.  
 
5. The poor are likely to be worst hit by water shortages.   In the past, poor communities in Peru and 
Bolivia have been prejudiced by inequitable water access, pricing policies and quality, and scant 
protection or legal rights over water usage.  Large economic concerns have usually enjoyed de facto 
priority, or have been given it by regional and national authorities. This historical situation is unlikely to 
change in a context of reduced water availability. For the urban poor in Peru, there are few signs that the 
government is considering policies of targeted subsidies or prices which could distribute future water 
stress more equitably.   
 
The rural poor are also likely to bear a disproportionate share of the cost of glacial retreat and water 
shortages, when compared to other sectors. This is for three reasons: hundreds of thousands of poor 
people will be in the front-line of increased exposure to the possibility of natural disasters in high-altitude 
glacial-fed areas. Small producers in the agro-export sector will be less able to adapt to less water 
availability compared to larger agro-industrial concerns. And political decisions over priorities for water 
usage are unlikely to favour small-scale upstream farmers over demands from the mining, agro-export, 
and hydroelectricity sectors, and from downstream cities needing a regular supply of drinking water.   2. The state of the melt 
 
South America contains more than 99 per cent of the world’s tropical glaciers. The others are found in 
Africa (most notably Mount Kilimanjaro) and Irian Jaya in western New Guinea. Table 1 shows the 2006 
estimates per country for glacial area in the five main South American countries which have tropical, low-
latitude glaciers. Of these Peru has more than 71 per cent of the surface area, and Bolivia about 20 per 
cent. Most of the glaciers are over 5,000m high. In mid- and high-latitudes, Chile and Argentina has a 
glacial area of 23,300 km², with more than 85 per cent located in Patagonia and Tierra del Fuego.  
 
Various techniques have been used over the last three decades to measure glacial retreat including 
satellite imagery and measurements of the mass balance, surface area and length of the glaciers. In the 
Andean tropical latitudes, glaciers have shown a general retreat and wasting, which has become 
particularly pronounced since the beginning of the 1980s. Glaciers that are thousands of years old have 
registered some of the fastest losses in their mass and surface area anywhere in the world. This is best 
illustrated by the research of an international group of scientists working with the IRD (Institut de 
recherche por le Développement) who have been closely monitoring ten glaciers spread throughout 
Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru for several years. Chart 1 shows their accelerated glacial loss, measured by 
both length and surface area since the period 1976-1980.    
 
Many other recent studies of South American tropical glaciers confirm the trend.  For example, aerial 
photography of the Cotopaxi Volcano ice cap in Ecuador shows a loss of surface area of 30 per cent 
between 1976 and 1997. In the north-east of Colombia, glaciers in the Cocuy National Park, which is 
home to the country’s largest glacial mass, are shrinking by 15 metres a year, and are expected to be lost 
completely by 2030.  The Quelcayya ice cap in Peru, which is the largest in the world, has lost thirty per 
cent of its glacier area since the early 1970s. The Qori Kalis glacier, which is part of the ice cap, is losing 
its surface area at a rate ten times faster than in the 1970s. (see box)  
 
Table 1 also shows the surface area decline in five South American countries with tropical glaciers. 
Although the start years vary between countries, overall the decline is 30 per cent. Several of the smaller, 
lower-altitude glaciers are in the final stages of wasting and will disappear completely soon.(see box on 
Chacaltaya)  Scientists say that whatever measures are taken by the international community in the 
immediate future, lower elevation glaciers will not be able to recover after thousands of years of 
existence. Once a glacier is lost, it does not come back.  
 
The process by which various factors have contributed to the accelerated decline of the tropical glaciers 
is complex. However, the main cause is generally considered to be the rise in near-surface average air 
temperatures, which have significantly increased over the last 60 years. Studies show an average 
increase of about 0.10°C per decade since 1939, with the bulk of the warming occurring over the last two 
decades. The rate of warming has almost tripled since the mid 1970s’ to between 0.32 and 0.34°C per 





Box: Three icons of glacial retreat 
 
Quelccaya, Peru:   
Since the mid-1970s Professor Lonnie Thompson of Ohio State University has been measuring the 
Qori Kalis glacier, the main outlet for the Quelccaya Ice Cap, the largest tropical ice cap in the world. It 
is situated in south-eastern Peru in the Vilcanota cordillera, at a height of 5,670 metres. When 
Professor Thompson first started, the annual glacial retreat was about 6 metres, but in recent years it 
has been 60 metres or more, equivalent to a ten-fold increase. As the glacier has melted, it has 
created a large lake at its foot.(see picture)  Ancient plant beds which have been buried for thousands 
of years have recently been uncovered due to glacial retreat.  This suggests that the glacier has 
probably never been as small as it is now in the last 5,000 years.  A popular ritual known as Qoyllur 
Riti, whereby local people climbed another glacier (Ausangate) in the Vilcanota cordillera, has been 
suspended due to the melting of the glacier. Local people used to take pieces of ice from the glacier 
which they believed could cure them of illnesses or help the fertility of their fields.  
 
Chacaltaya, Bolivia:  
Situated just 20 kilometres north-east of La Paz in the cordillera real, the Chacaltaya glacier has 
become an icon of the effects of global warming, and a laboratory for predicting what may befall other 
small Andean glaciers.  It used to be the world’s highest ski run at 5,360 metres. Meaning ‘Cold Road’ 
in Aymara, Chacaltaya is thought be about 18,000 years-old, but it has lost 82 per cent of its area 
since 1982. When its decline first began to be measured in 1991, it was predicted that it might 
disappear altogether in 2015. It is now predicted to be completely lost in 2007 or 2008.  In 2006, what 
was once a 500 metre-long glacier had been reduced to two small areas of about 60 metres by 20 
metres.(see picture)  
 
Antizana, Ecuador:  
Antizana is a volcano 5,760 metres-high situated on the equator near the Ecuadorean capital of Quito. 
Two of its glacial tongues have been monitored by the World Glacier Monitoring Service (WGMS) and 
the IRD for several years. Their surface area and volume has declined by at least 30 per cent since 
1956.  Just in the period 1996-98, the glacier shrunk 100 metres and lost 8 per cent of its area. Quito 
gets about 10 per cent of its water from surrounding ice caps. Scientists at the IRD calculate that the 
complete disappearance of Antizana could result in a 40-70 per cent decrease in water run-off from 
the glacier. Below Antizana is the La Mica glacial lake which alone provides drinking water to a third of 
the city.  The lake’s water level is reported to have dropped 5 meters a year recently due to increased 
demand.  
 
3. Predicting the future 
 
Every glacier has an accumulation zone, where it gains mass, and an ablation zone where it loses mass 
to evaporation and liquid water run-off. Between the two zones is what is known as an ‘equilibrium line 
altitude’ (ELA) above which accumulation outstrips ablation. The height of the ELA of glaciers in the 
tropical Andes has been constantly rising in recent decades, by as much as 300 metres in some cases. 
The best analogy is that of a bank account built up over thousands of years. Once you start taking out of 
the account more than you are paying in, eventually you go bankrupt.  Only glaciers higher than 5,400-
5,500 metres are thought to be able to recover their mass in the current climate variability.  
 
The central point is that unlike for example glaciers in the European Alps, which do not usually melt 
during the winter months but accumulate snow, glaciers in the tropical Andes melt and feed the rivers all 
year round during both the wet and dry seasons (which vary according to geographical region).  During 
the months of the dry seasons (roughly in the tropical Andes between April/May and September/October), 
the glaciers provide most of the water as glacial run-off. They act as a vast store of water, which is slowly 
released during the months when there is no precipitation. They are like a buffer zone which smoothes 
out seasonal variations in water supply. 
 
Many basins fed by glaciers have experienced an increase in runoff in recent years, which researchers 
ascribe to increased glacial melt or retreat because precipitation has not changed.  In other words, there 
may be more water in the rivers due to glacial melt, but the cost is a reduction in the storage of frozen 
water in the glaciers. The key question is how many years this temporary increase in runoff is likely to 
last, and what happens when the more of the glaciers melt or disappear completely.  
 
Much of the research on how glacial melt is affecting current water availability and the modelling for the 
future has been carried out in Peru, using data taken from the vast Cordillera Blanca. The range includes 
Peru’s highest mountain (Huascarán at 6,768 metres) and contains more than 600 km² of glacial area, or 
a quarter of the world’s tropical glaciers. The research suggests that in the Cordillera Blanca there has 
been a net annual increase in hydrological runoff, particularly in watersheds or valleys beneath glaciers. 
In one area, glacial melt now accounts for 58 per cent of the annual mean discharge, a 23 per cent 
increase since 1998-9.(Mark et al., 2005) 
 
Researchers predict this is a temporary effect due to current rates of ablation. In the longer-term, some 
models suggest a dramatic decline in water availability some time this century as the glaciers disappear 
and precipitation becomes the only source of water.(CONAM, 2005)  Chart 2 shows the predicted water 
flow from the 12 glaciers in the Rio Santa valley beneath the Cordillera Blanca from 2000 onwards, and 
depicts a rapid fall-off after 2050.  
 
However, these results have been called into question. A more sophisticated model taking into account 
more variables suggests that overall annual discharge may not vary that much (due to increased direct 
run-off in the wet season) but that seasonality intensifies significantly.(Juen et al, 2007) 
 
One of the central questions in assessing future water availability is what percentage of the water supply 
to any particular zone comes from glacial melt, as opposed to other sources such as precipitation in the 
wet season or underground wells and aquifers.  In many regions the research is yet to be carried out. But 
one study of the Rio Santa valley suggests that glacial melt can provide 10 to 20 per cent of the total 
annual water run-off. This figure can rise to 40 per cent in the dry season, when water is most in 
demand.(Mark et al, 2005)  
 
An equally important issue is how much the water supply varies during the wet and dry seasons.  The 
study of the Rio Santa valley (by Juen et al., 2007) concluded that water supply during the dry season is 
significantly reduced.  Based on IPCC estimates of future temperature rises, the study predicted that by 
2050 the glacial area above the valley would have been reduced by between 38 and 60 per cent, and the 
volume of glacial melt by 35 to 53 per cent. It calculated that seasonality would intensify: runoff would increase in the one to three months of the wet season by between 10-26 per cent, but it would drop by 
11-23 per cent in the dry season (which could last a longer period of months than previously).  This, the 
study concluded, was a ‘most dramatic change’ predicted for the dry season which would ‘challenge 
future water management drastically’.  
  
Whatever the exact projected figures, there is consensus amongst scientists that at some point in the 
future there will be much less water available during the dry season as a result of glacial retreat.  This 
seasonality could be exacerbated by less dry season precipitation: many of the climate change models – 
though not all – predict more precipitation for the tropical Andes towards the end of the century during the 
wet season, and less precipitation during the dry season.  
 
4. Future water conflicts are more likely 
 
There is a severe risk that conflicts over water availability in glacier-fed areas could become more likely in 
the context of less water availability in the dry season.  Short-term increases due to glacial retreat could 
encourage governments, planners and business sectors to assume greater water availability.  But in the 
long-term, as glacial retreat progresses, all the signs are that there will be less water available in the dry 
season. This will be compounded by increasing populations and therefore demand not just in the many 
large cities in the Andes located over 2,500 metres high but in downstream cities like the Peruvian capital 
of Lima.   
 
Chart 3 depicts in a simple way how one recent study sees the increased likelihood of potential conflict 
over water in the future.  
 
There are already plenty of examples in Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador of significant water disputes in the last 
few years between urban and rural consumers, mining companies and local farmers, hydro-electric plants 
and downstream consumers, or large-scale commercial agriculture and small producers. The 
disappearance of the snow on the Cotacachi volcano near Quito in Ecuador is often seen as a warning of 
conflicts to come. There has been a decline there in agriculture, tourism and biodiversity, and disputes 
have intensified as a result of less or no water in local streams and rivers.(Rhoades and Zapata 2006) 
 
In Bolivia, access to water and the price of water for low-income groups have become highly politicised 
issues. The focus of two recent disputes has been between low-income consumer groups and the pricing 
policies of foreign utility companies. The widely-publicised ‘water wars’ in Cochabamba in 2000 caused 
intense civil disturbance as the Aguas del Tunari consortium led by the US company Bechtel raised 
prices by 35 per cent on average (and up to 200 per cent), way beyond what many poor consumers could 
afford.  A major element of the water conflict in Cochabamba was a general shortage of water resources. 
 
Another multinational company, Suez, who took over water provision in El Alto after privatisation in 1997, 
also faced sustained protests from community groups. Suez maintains that it increased water and 
sewage connections to thousands of new consumers. But the protestors argued that prices had risen by 
35 per cent since the consortium led by Suez took over; that more than 200,000 people were left with no 
possibility of access to water because of a failure to expand water infrastructure to the outskirts of the 
city; and that connection charges for water and sewage had risen to US$445, more than six months of 
income at the national minimum wage.  
 
Whether a repetition of such sustained protests over water takes place in the future will depend on a wide 
variety of social, political and economic factors, including government policies. However, it is not too 
alarmist to argue that given the past history of water disputes, given the fact that significant sectors of 
Peru’s and Bolivia’s social movements are organizing around water issues, and given a future of less dry season water availability, municipal and national authorities will need to pay considerable attention to this 
issue to avoid serious social unrest.  
 
5. The impact on macro-development 
 
Falls in dry season runoff are likely to have a major impact on the macro-economic development of Peru, 
Bolivia and Ecuador. The three countries are to a significant degree dependent on glacial melt for a whole 
range of economic activities and for drinking water to some of their cities. They also depend on hydro-
electric power (historically over 50 per cent in Ecuador, 70 per cent in Bolivia, and more than 80 per cent 
in Peru, although this last figure will drop with the coming on-stream of gas-powered stations).  
 
Peru is particularly vulnerable to projected water shortages largely due to the geography of the 
country. It is thought to be the South American country most vulnerable to water stress in the 
future. A study published by the Tyndall centre in 2003 placed Peru in the top 10 countries in the 
world most subject to climate-related natural disasters in the decade 1991-2000.(Brooks and 
Adger 2003) 
 
70 per cent of Peru’s population live along the Pacific coast, which is also where much of the 
country’s economic activity is based. Yet it is one of the most arid regions in the world. It is 
almost totally dependent on water flowing down from the Andes via 50 or so rivers fed by 
snowmelt, precipitation or glacial melt. Without that water the coastal area would be a virtual 
desert as it has less than 2 per cent of the country’s water resources. In contrast, the Atlantic or 
eastern side of the Andes has 98 per cent of Peru’s available water and 26 per cent of the 
population.  Much of the water is ‘on the wrong side of the wall’. 
 
Peru’s boom sectors: Moreover, the boom sectors of the Peruvian economy in recent years have been 
water-intensive. The value of non-traditional agro-exports has risen three-fold from US$302m in 1998 to 
US$1,008 million in 2005. In the same year asparagus exports for example were worth US$263m, 
compared to US$396m for Peru’s traditional coffee exports. But unlike coffee, asparagus requires 
constant irrigation. Artichokes too require more watering than non-export crops such as potatoes. 
Production of sugar cane, another thirsty crop, is also set to increase because of international demand for 
bio-fuels. Indeed, in general the boom in agro-exports has meant a huge increase in demand for irrigation 
in the desert coastal strip which already had a precarious water supply. An estimated US$5bn has been 
invested in irrigation in recent years, of which US$3.5bn was invested in coastal areas. More than 1.2 
million hectares have been planted with crops that need irrigation, significant parts of which currently 
come from glacial melt.  
  
Likewise, the mining sector has received massive foreign investment recently due to high world prices 
driven by demand from China. Mining exports accounted for two-thirds of Peru’s increased export 
revenue between 2001 and 2005 (about $6.5 billion of the $10 billion increase). But mining too demands 
high usage of water to wash and treat the minerals.  For example, exploration at the world’s largest gold 
mine at Yanacocha, Cajamarca has provoked conflict for several years between the mine owners 
(principally the Newmont Mining Corporation) and local farmers over the quantity and quality of the water 
available locally as a result of the heap leaching process used in the mine to extract the gold.  
 
Peru’s Rio Santa valley: The Rio Santa valley is illustrative of the enormous pressure on future water 
supplies that could affect areas of Peru where water supply is in part glacier-fed. The waters from the 
Cordillera Blanca drain into the Rio Santa via several tributary valleys which then flows into the Pacific 
Ocean. As already mentioned, potentially up to 40 per cent of the dry season discharge from the river is 
estimated to come from melting ice which is not replenished by annual precipitation.  A significant drop in 
water availability would massively affect drinking water supplies, hydroelectric power and irrigation for 
commercial and small-scale agriculture.  Most of these sectors, and particularly energy, need a supply of 
water all year round.   
The water from this one river supplies all of the following: a large area of mostly small-scale, intense 
agricultural activity at between 2,000 and 4,000 metres; a power production plant representing 5 per cent 
of Peru’s total energy production capacity; what would be a very dry area of large-scale intensive 
commercial agriculture worth about US$100m a year in the lower valleys including two special irrigation 
projects for export crops (Chavimochic and Chinecas); and a large part of the drinking water to two major 
urban areas on the Pacific coast with a combined population of more than one million people (Chimbote 
and Trujillo).(see chart 4)  One recent study calculated that the dry season flow of the river was already 
insufficient to satisfy the needs just of Chavimochic and Chinecas.(Vergara et al., 2006)   Any attempt in 
the future to capture more of the precipitation could be seriously hampered by the topography of the 
valley which makes the building of more reservoirs very difficult.     
 
Calculating the potential economic cost of glacial melt is an imprecise science. However, in one of the few 
studies to attempt it, a 2006 World Bank study estimated that the annual cost of reduced glacial melting 
just for the hydroelectric plant in the Rio Santa valley was between US$6m and US$72m.(Vergara et al., 
2006)  This figure rose to between US$12m-US$144m, if there was no glacial melt at all. For the whole of 
the country’s energy sector, the cost was calculated to be between US$60-US$748m for reduced melting, 
and US$120-US$1,500 for no glacial melt.  
 
Lima: a crisis waiting to happen. The same World Bank study attempted to calculate the cost of 
replacing the water lost from glacial melt to the supply of drinking water to the 8 million people living in 
Lima, the capital of Peru.  This was estimated to exceed US$116m a year once the glacial melt ceased.  
Lima is particularly vulnerable to water shortages, largely because it is built on a desert.  The city already 
has a serious water deficit. Figures from Lima’s municipal water company, SEDAPAL, show a shortfall of 
3.4 m³/s of water in 2005 between supply and demand.(SEDAPAL 2006) This figure was for drinking 
water alone, and did not include sanitation. SEDAPAL projections predict a very significant increase in the 
shortfall between 2005 and 2035 (unless new public works are carried out), partly as a result of 
increasing demand from new arrivals to the city currently estimated at 130,000 people a year.   
 
Lima gets its water from three rivers in the Cordillera Central, of which the Rio Rimac is the most 
important. It is not certain what percentage of the water flowing into the three rivers comes from glacial 
melt. It is generally thought that it is less for example than the Rio Santa, but still a significant amount.  In 
other words, the loss of water from glacial melt will in the long-term undoubtedly exacerbate an already 
acute situation facing Lima.  To give an idea of the scale of the problem, the drought in 2004 caused a 
serious shortfall in water supply. The total amount of water held in the reservoirs serving Lima is normally 
the equivalent of about 280 million cubic metres (mm³), less than a year’s demand and far less for 
example, than the reserves of Santiago or Bogota which have smaller populations.  This fell to only 80 
mm³ in one month during the drought. The authorities resorted to rationing and to using more of the water 
from wells (which currently represents about 20 per cent of Lima’s water supply) extracted at a lower 
depth. The amount of water taken out of the wells far exceeded the recommended usage (set in part by 
the risk of salinisation).  
 
The absence of sufficient reserves, the likelihood of more frequent weather extremes such as drought,  
and the reliance on one 60-kilometre Transandean tunnel (which carries water from the eastern side of 
the Andes) already makes Lima very vulnerable to water shortages.  Long-term reduction due to glacial 
melt compounds the vulnerability.  It is worth pointing out the amount of water Peru has already lost to 
glacial melt. One recent calculation suggests that on the assumption that 22 per cent of glacial area has 
disappeared in the last 30 years, the country has ‘lost’ the equivalent of about 7,000 mm³ of water in 
glacial melt, or 10 years’ water supply to Lima. (CONAM, Al día, December 2004) 
 
La Paz, Bolivia: The water shortage facing Bolivia’s main city, La Paz, is not as acute as Lima’s partly 
because of its smaller population, but it is still an urgent challenge. 80 per cent of the drinking water 
supply for El Alto, the large sprawling city above La Paz, and the two sides of upper La Paz comes from 
the Tuni Condoriri range of glaciers.  Various measurements show the area of the 15 original glaciers in 
the range has reduced by more than a third from 1983 to 2006. Five glaciers may have already 
disappeared completely and at current rate of depletion, the others could disappear some time between 2025 and 2050.  It is not known how much of the annual water supply comes from glacial melt, but it 
could be as much as 60 per cent.  
 
Even now La Paz and El Alto, with a combined population of nearly 2 million people, face a pressing need 
for more water. The arrival of several thousand migrants from rural areas to El Alto every year means 
demand for water increases. One detailed study carried out in 2007 predicts that as early as 2009 there 
will be more demand than water available in the reservoirs feeding the two cities assuming the supply 
remains the same.(Ramírez,  2007) Based on a predicted annual population increase of about 4 per cent 
in El Alto, projections of connection rates and demand, plus estimates of water currently available in the 
reservoirs, the study concludes that from 2009 onwards water supplies will enter a situation of ‘stress’, 
though not of ‘crisis’.  La Paz is also dependent for virtually all of its energy supplies on hydroelectric 
power. The water driving the generators comes mainly from the two glacier ranges of the Zongo valley 
and Charquiri, both of which have been subject to accelerated glacial loss in the last 30 years.  
 
Quito: About 10 per cent of the water supply to Quito, the capital of Ecuador, is also estimated to come 
from surrounding ice caps. The Cotacachi volcano near Quito (at 4,996 metres) lost its permanent snow 
at the turn of the century, while the glaciers of Cotopaxi and Antizana are calculated to have lost about a 
third of their surface areas in the last 50 years.(see box)  The flow of the Rio Pita, which is one of the 
rivers feeding the city’s main hydroelectric plant, is estimated to have decreased by about 50 per cent in 
the last 20 years. Scientists based in Quito predict the country is likely to lose at least four of its eight 
most important glaciers over the next 10 to 20 years. 
 
 
6. The impact on poverty and livelihoods  
 
Overview: The above discussion shows Peru’s, and to a lesser extent Bolivia’s, high vulnerability to less 
water availability in the dry season.  The two countries are very dependent on hydro-electric power.  A 
significant percentage of urban drinking water supplies come from glacial melt. Moreover, in Peru’s case, 
its macro-economic development could be seriously hampered as a result of its reliance on water-
sensitive sectors. The country is currently wedded to an economic model heavily dependent on year-
round irrigation for its agro-export sector, and on a regular supply of water for its mining industry.   
 
It is hard to predict accurately what will be the effect of a less reliable water supply on different sectors of 
the economy, and on the poor within them.  Any reduction in economic activity as a result of water 
shortages will of course affect all sectors of society.   For example, a significant downturn in Peru’s agro-
export sector would have wide ranging effects on private companies, low income migrant workers, small-
scale producers and government revenues.  However, there is a strong likelihood that higher income 
groups and large economic concerns will be, as they have been in the past, politically favoured and better 
resourced to be able to protect their interests. 
 
There are other reasons beyond historical precedent why the poorer sectors are more likely to bear the 
brunt of water shortages.  Current pricing policies and water distribution in urban areas of Peru are 
inequitable. It is unlikely that low income urban dweller or settlers will be given priority for water access 
when there is less water available.  Peru does not have in place a system of targeted subsidies for 
connections and water use, as developed in Chile and Colombia.  Moreover, there is high likelihood that 
any projected tariff increases to pay for infrastructure works would be applied as a flat rate increase rather 
than means-tested.  High-income groups will be better able to mitigate the effects of reductions in drinking 
water availability, as they have done in the past, by buying home-based storage capacity or paying for 
extra water delivered by other means than a piped connection.  
 
In Peru’s rural sector, small-scale producers of agro-export crops are already at a disadvantage in terms 
of access to irrigation.  Thousands of small-holders living in glacier-fed areas are more vulnerable to the 
increased likelihood of natural disasters due to glacial retreat.  And irrigation for upstream small-scale 
agricultural activity is unlikely to take political precedence over the multiple demands for water, including 
downstream drinking water for large cities.  
  
The urban poor  
 
Currently, water distribution in most parts of urban Peru and Bolivia is inequitable. For example in 
Cochabamba, the richest 20 per cent of the population had 93 per cent coverage compared to only 32 per 
cent amongst the poorest 20 per cent. In Lima about 90 per cent of homes are estimated to have a water 
connection, but the distribution is uneven. 95 per cent of homes in the north and central parts of the city 
had connections in 2004, but this figure drops to between 58 and 69 per cent in the south and east. 
Those who don’t have connections have to depend on stand-pipes or trucks that deliver water.  Water 
delivered by trucks is more expensive, less clean and less reliable. In general, in both countries poorer 
communities who depend on informal water sellers usually pay more for their water, both as a percentage 
of their household income and on a per litre basis, than those with connections to a central network.  Lack 
of access to clean water and sanitation makes poor income groups more prone to child illnesses.   
 
Recent research estimated that those living in Lima’s slums or low income settlements paid on average 
between 5 and 10 times more for their water than high-income residents. (UNDP 2006)  If a home does 
have a water pipe connection, the same rate is paid by consumers in better-off or poorer suburbs. 
Average daily use is calculated to be in 30 litres a day for a shanty town dweller receiving their water via a 
truck. In contrast, it rises to 405 litres a day in Lima’s richest suburb of San Isidro, where it is possible to 
visit a well-watered 18-hole golf course and see servants frequently watering ubiquitous lawns and even 
the pavement.  
 
In a context of greater water scarcity, lower income groups will be less able to pay for extra water supplies 
from bottles or trucks compared to higher income groups. Many of the houses in San Isidro for example 
have supplementary tanks to store water at times of rationing, an option not open to poorer families. 
 
Paying for public works: The long-term effects of glacial retreat can be mitigated by capturing and 
storing more of the wet season precipitation. However, this means significant investment in more dams, 
tunnels or reservoirs (whether they be large, medium or small-scale), as this will reduce vulnerability to 
seasonal variations in the decades to come. In Peru engineers and independent consultants have long 
urged the municipal and national authorities to build a second tunnel through the Andes (to capture water 
from the Atlantic side) and/or to construct more dams and reservoirs in order to ease the pressure on 
Lima. The building of a second tunnel alone would cost at least US$100m. This figure rises to nearly 
US$300m if all the projected works necessary to have a more secure supply are carried out.  
 
In Bolivia it is highly likely at least one new dam will be necessary to capture more precipitation for the 
projected increase in demand for drinking water in El Alto alone. Connections to homes that lack water in 
El Alto are estimated to cost at least $25 million, on top of the costs of expanding the basic water 
infrastructure to the thousands of new arrivals every year. And in Ecuador, Quito’s municipal water 
company is reported to be planning a multi-million dollar project to get water to the city from the Rios 
Orientales, a river east of the Andes.   
 
In Cochabamba (a city of 600,000 people) water provision is currently back in the hands of a municipal 
company, albeit with more social control from local communities.  However, the number of people with 
water connections and access to sewage had still not improved significantly by 2007 – more than five 
years after the expulsion of Aguas del Tunari and despite a return to lower water charges. It is estimated 
that the cost of building a new dam and aqueducts necessary to increase supply to the city would be 
between US$100-200 million, an enormous amount for the municipal company whose capital budget is 
around US$5m.(Forero, 2005) 
 
Such public works are much more pressing in the context of a long-term decline in water availability 
during the dry season.  But even before the long-term impact of glacial retreat is felt, increasing demand 
from urban populations will put great pressure on water supplies. For example, the important policy aim of 
bringing water connections to the estimated 900,000 inhabitants of Lima currently without water would 
considerably raise the demands on reservoirs, partly because the average daily use rises from 30 litres a day without a connection to 110 litres a day with a connection. Again, more large-scale investment is 
needed to ensure sufficient water reserves to meet the demand.   
 
Public works are expensive.  Who will pay? It is possible that in-country urban consumers will be asked to 
pay increased water tariffs to fund such works.  All consumers, both high and low-income, are likely to be 
affected.  However, it would be a more equitable approach to ask high-income consumers to pay more of 
the burden.  Such an approach has the dual advantages of spreading the costs more evenly and 
mitigating the chances of more social conflict over water. Studies from Colombia and Chile show that 
subsidy schemes can be highly effective in reducing inequalities. Chile has used means testing to identify 
low-income residents for the receipt of water subsidies, while Colombia uses property values and 
residency to identify then help low-income households.(UNDP, 2006)  Both schemes are predicated on 
high-income groups paying more for their water.   
 
More revenue from wealthier water users can help to subsidize poor ones, but would probably not cover 
the substantial costs of constructing the infrastructure necessary for new water systems.  Donor countries 
and agencies will have to help finance such adaptation projects.  Poor countries such as Bolivia, Peru 
and Ecuador already have huge pressure on their budgets to fund a wide range of basic services such as 
education and health. They are also at the forefront of suffering the impact of man-made climate change 
and will have to pay what amounts to a type of tax for the carbon emissions of industrialised countries. 
Yet they have low-carbon economies and are hardly responsible. Peru for example is estimated to be 
responsible for only 0.1 per cent of the world’s carbon emissions (compared to the USA’s 22 per cent).     
 
National governments and political leaders in such countries will also have to embrace a long-term view 
of the national interest beyond the cycle of five-year presidential terms.  Much of the investment in 
infrastructure only bears fruit several years later.  
 
The rural poor 
 
Agro-export sector: It is likely that in the context of reduced water availability, small-scale agricultural 
producers in Peru will come lower in the pecking order than urban consumers, hydroelectric projects, 
commercial agriculture and mining companies.  The last two sectors have in the recent past enjoyed 
favourable investment legislation, tax breaks, credit facilities and cheap water availability to foster their 
growth. This order of priorities is unlikely to be reversed.  
 
In the agro-export sector, most of the new crops are produced by large-scale farmers or industrial 
concerns. For example, there are around 2,000 producers of asparagus in the country, and about 60,000 
people employed directly by the industry. 56 per cent of the land cultivated with asparagus belongs to 200 
producers owning more than 50 hectares of land.  There are some smaller coastal producers, but they 
have a relatively high level of education and resources.  The asparagus sector is markedly different to the 
coffee sector where around 85 per cent of the 150,000 coffee producers have less than five 
hectares.(Frazer and Rojas 2007)  
 
Large-scale concerns have benefited from the opening of new areas for cultivation. For example, agro-
industrial companies on the coast took advantage of large irrigation projects such as the Chavimochic 
project in the Rio Santa valley mentioned above. They had the capital to buy newly irrigated areas that 
were unavailable to small producers.   Moreover, in many areas, companies have the capital to invest in 
their own wells, whereas smaller producers have to pay for their surface water or pay high charges to well 
owners.  
 
Small-scale producers that are currently involved in growing crops for export are likely to be less able to 
continue in a future when less water is available. For example, one recent study found that in the Mantaro 
valley, which is partly glacial-fed, water shortages are already restricting farmers to growing only 1-2 
hectares of artichokes each.(Frazer and Rojas 2007)  Many do not own their own land so there is less 
incentive for them to invest in better irrigation.  Moreover, the current government’s laudable efforts to 
promote agricultural export production in the sierra (the ‘Sierra Exportadora’ programme) may also be 
affected by reduced water availability.    
The general point is that in the past large-scale agro-industrial interests in Peru have benefited from the 
heavy extraction of water at a much lower cost than for smaller producers.  The whole sector has of 
course generated several thousand jobs and increased revenue for the state, but large concerns have 
benefited disproportionately. In a future of water shortages, it would be surprising if large-scale producers 
were not better able to adapt and were not given priority from the state.  
 
Disaster mitigation: One area of particular concern is the vulnerability of poor rural highland 
communities to the increased probability of ‘natural’ disasters as a result of accelerated glacial melt.  The 
rapid melting of the glaciers can lead to rivers bursting their banks or to the formation of glacial melt-water lakes 
which can suddenly burst as a result of excessive volume or large ice chunks collapsing into them. Landscapes also 
become destabilized as a result of glacial melt, one of whose consequences can be major rock-slides. 
 
The region under the Cordillera Blanca is particularly vulnerable. Five major glacier disasters (outburst floods and 
avalanches) have killed nearly 30,000 people in the area since 1941.(Carey M., 2005)  The two most deadly were in 
1941 when Lake Palcacocha produced an outburst flood that killed 5,000 people and destroyed a third of the city of 
Huaráz, and in 1970 when an earthquake caused an avalanche-landslide from Mt. Huascarán.  The town of Yungay 
at the foot of Huascarán was destroyed in just a few minutes with the death of 18,000 people.  
 
At least half a million people live directly below the Cordillera Blanca’s glaciers and hundreds of glacial lakes, 
many of which are recently formed.  There have been no major disasters since 1970 despite the accelerated glacial 
retreat. However, one recent study found that local people lack faith in government officials to protect them, and do 
not trust information from Peruvian scientists. It also pointed out that local scientists have miniscule budgets to 
investigate glacier-related threats and initiate disaster mitigation projects.(Carey M., 2005)  In general, poorer rural 
communities are likely to be disproportionately affected.  Being able to expand their pastoral lands to higher 
elevations may also expose them to more risk of landslides. As in many other parts of the world, they do not have 
the necessary warning systems, emergency plans, infrastructure or financial support to avoid bearing the brunt of 
any disaster.   
 
Small-scale highland agriculture: Much of Peru’s and Bolivia’s poverty is found in rural departments, 
and particularly in the highland altiplano. Six million people in Peru alone are estimated to be dependent 
on small-scale agriculture situated at between 2,500 and 4,000 metres of altitude.  The vast majority of 
agricultural activity there is dependent on precipitation rather than irrigation from glacial melt.  It is 
probably safe to assume that in the long-term these areas will become even more dependent on rainfall 
for their agriculture, but it is not known with any degree of certainty if precipitation is likely to be more or 
less intense, and whether it will be more or less easy to predict.  
 
It is well-documented that rural Andean communities have a centuries-old culture of being able to adapt 
to changing environments, including water shortages and the unpredictability of rainfall.(e.g. Earls J., 
2006) Nevertheless, more information on the possible impact of glacial retreat and other climate change 
on the rural poor could help both communities and regional/national governments to plan better to 
mitigate these effects.   
 
The few studies that have been carried out suggest that the perceptions of low-income rural inhabitants in 
both countries about climate change centre on the recent changes to local climate patterns. This seems 
to be a more immediate and pressing (weather-related) concern than the long-term availability of water 
due to glacial melt.  Small-scale farmers interviewed in the studies in different parts of the Peruvian and 
Bolivian altiplano stress the increasingly erratic nature of the local climate. There are of course differing 
perceptions of what is changing, but there is consensus about the increased extremes of weather (for 
example more intense hailstorms, drought, or frosts depending on the region), and about the much 
greater unpredictability in weather patterns. This has seriously affected planting cycles as traditional 
indicators of forthcoming weather patterns have become more unreliable.  
 
However, one detailed study published in 2006 by two US academics does point to some of the key 
issues that will impinge on rural inhabitants and their livelihoods specifically as a result of glacial 
melt.(Young and Lipton, 2006)  Interviews were carried out in 2002-3 with more than 100 people in the Huascarán National Park (HNP) in Peru which includes much of the Cordillera Blanca, where more than 
330,000 people live. The head of one typical family living at 4,290m noted that:  
 
‘As glaciers have receded, some drainage and runoff channels that were accessed <…> diminished in flow and were 
now either intermittent or dry. As a result of this change, he needed to obtain water from sources further away where 
runoff and glacial melt had increased. Also, he related how, in some valley bottoms, lakes and wetland areas 
increased in size, so they had changed the sites where they took their sheep for pasturing.’ 
 
Changing areas for pasture and growing crops at higher altitudes are two commonly-observed features of 
communities or families adapting to climate change in the altiplano.  In the HNP study, some farmers in the eastern 
region were integrating different varieties of maize, which were in demand and could be grown at slightly higher 
elevations.  The authors of the study also note that farmers are very concerned about an increase in pests 
spreading to cattle and sheep in higher pasture zones. In addition, farmers claimed that crops did not 
produce the same yields because of a loss of harvest to fungi and pests.  Women, they write, are 
primarily concerned with the declining quality of water, as it is usually they who have to do the water 
fetching for cooking.  Women in the area of study commented that regular water sources had become 
increasingly high in sediment. More time was needed to filter the water.  
 
Poorer communities linked to tourism were also affected. The authors found that:  
 
‘For the communities that take tourists to glacial areas, many individuals were concerned that due to the 
rapid retreat of glaciers they may eventually lose what has become an important income source from 
tourism. Porters, cooks, and merchants selling handicrafts and supplies at key locations for glacial visits 
discussed the added travel time to sites where tourists are now able to walk on the glaciers. There are 
more risks involved for accommodating tourists to visit the higher elevations and therefore, it requires a 
slower ascent. Thus, it reduces the number of tourists per day that the porters can satisfy and 
accommodate.’ 
 
The adaptation by individual families to a changing local environment as a result of glacial melt and more general 
climate change is typical of thousands of highland families. In a highly complex decision-making process, families 
weigh up different options in the face of multiple changing circumstances of which glacial retreat is just one.  There 
is already considerable evidence, for example, of families or communities in other regions of the altiplano 
integrating, or changing to, different varieties of crops such as maize and potatoes which can be grown at higher 
altitudes, or are more resistant to extremes of weather (including less irrigation), or grow better or faster in warmer 
temperatures.  
 
A major concern of the interviewees in the HNP study was over future conflicts around water use in the area.  The 
study reported that: 
 
‘In one northern valley where water was being diverted for hydroelectric purposes, informants discussed their 
concerns about the lack of sufficient water for household use and for irrigation of mid-elevation crops. In other 
areas, freshwater primarily from glacial melt was channeled for mining and industrial needs that would otherwise be 
used by the rural populations for agriculture and consumption.’  
 
The study was in no doubt as to the potential losers in a situation of water scarcity:  
 
‘Private, transnational corporate institutions with political and economic clout have access to water resources and 
are assured of compliance from national and regional institutions that manage <the park’s> natural resources and 
protect its biodiversity. Informants commented in interviews and in public meetings that, given the private, regional, 
and national interests associated with water usage, the local communities will be the first affected by water scarcity 
and imposed restrictions, while potentially the last to have their needs addressed.’ 
 
This endorses the expectation mentioned above that conflicts over water are likely to become more 
acute. Political decisions by which some interest groups get priority treatment over others will become 
more contested.  Historically, poor communities in Bolivia and Peru have usually had much less 
resources and legal or other forms of protection than other sectors involved in water disputes. In Bolivia, where 80 per cent of the country’s water is used in agriculture and nearly 40 per cent of the population is 
rural, uncertainty around rural water rights for small farmers and indigenous groups increased as a result 
of the neo-liberal reforms introduced in the 1980s and ‘90s. However, a national organization of irrigators 
has been formed in recent years in order to try to put small-scale agriculture on a more equal footing with 
the influence other sectors like mining, manufacturing, hydroelectricity and urban consumers have 
traditionally enjoyed when deciding priorities over water usage. (Perreault T.) 
 
Peru too has a national committee of irrigators, committed to protecting the water interests of small-scale 
producers mostly in the coastal area.  Other social sectors have also begun to organize more around 
water issues. FENTAP (the Federation of Potable Water and Sewage Workers of Peru) is primarily 
concerned with keeping water companies in public hands in Huancayo and other cities, but they have 
also started to make proposals about how to deal with water shortages in the future. The National 
Commission of Communities Affected by Mining (CONACAMI) is also concerned about access to enough 
water unpolluted by mining companies, mostly in the altiplano.  
 
Such groups will have to be consulted when national, regional, and municipal governments are devising 
water management policies designed to adapt to, or mitigate, the effects of glacial melt.  This would be 
one significant way of reducing the possibility that low-income groups bear a disproportionate amount of 
the cost of adapting to climate change.  
 
  Charts and Tables 
 
Table 1:  Loss of glacial surface area in five South American countries.  
 
Country:     Area in km² (year)    Area in km² (2006) 
 
Peru      1,958    (1970)    1,370 
Bolivia       562  (1975)         393 
Ecuador        113  (1976)           79 
Colombia       109  (1950)           76 
Venezuela           3  (1950)             2 
 
Total      2,744     1,920 
Source: Comunidad Andina, forthcoming 2007 publication 
 
 






































































































Source: Francou B. and Vincent C., Les glaciers à l'épreuve du changement 
climatique, IRD and Belin Editions, Paris, forthcoming 2007, p. 276.  
 
 
Chart 2:  Predictions for river flows with glacial run-off, 2000-2250, Cordillera Blanca, Peru 
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